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0RIGiI OF T-I] 2P3? -;UITY

THE GROUND OF CONS ''1-CTT7T'

First,--

Equity is

A'M

EELIEF TTLRZ IN ON

-IiiAU]_

branch of rmedial

L

jastice -founded u-pon

principles of ri-,it, equa1ity, and morlity, as expland
promulgated in the decisions of its courts and it has the
capacity of growth in the direction of its settled principles.
In the broad sense in which t*tis term is sometimes used,
it

signifies ntural
In

justice.

a more liY.itc6

it, ,
it

between contending par-ties.
tion,

in

cts

qlicatjo:-,
.
1 ustice

This is the moral significa-

reference to the rights of parties havincg conflictig

claims; but ay)-lied to courts and their jurisdiction and
proccedingrs, it

has a more restrainecd &nd liite'

significa-

tion.
One division of courts,, is into Courts of Law, and
Courts -of Equity.
tion,

is

And Equity,

a br'anch of rumdial

in

this relation and applica-

justice by and through :zhich

relief is afforded to suitors in its Courts.

-2The difference betwen tho remedial justice of the courts
of co-mon law and that of the courts of equity is marked and
material.

That administord by the courts of law is limited

by the principles of the common .!a,' ,

(which are to a great

extent positive. and inflexible ), and especially by the nature
and character of the process and pleadings, and of the judgments which those courts can render;

because the pleadings

cannot fully present all the matters in controversy, nor can
the judgments be adapted to the especial exigencies which may.
exist in particular case~s.

It is not uncommon, also, for

cases to'fail in those courts, from the fact that too few or
too nany persons have been joined as parties, or because the
pleadings have not been framed with sufficient technical precision.
The remedial process of the courts of Equity, on the
other hand, admits, and generally requires that all persons
having an interest shall be made parties, and makes a large
allowance for amendments by summoning and discharging parties
after commencement of suit.
The plcadings are usually framed s; as to present to the
consideration of the court the whole case, witl its possible

-3legal rights, and al'L its equities,-- that is, all the groundk
upon which the suitor is or is not entitled to relief upon
the principles of Equity--

And its final remOdial process

may be so varied as to muect tlio requirements of these equities
in cascs.where the juriidiction of the courts of equity
exists, by commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is
wrong.

In other words its final process is varied so as to

enable the courts to do that equitable justice between the
parties that the case demands, either by copnanding what is
to be done, or prohibiting what is threatened to be done.
The principles upon which, and the words and forms by
and through which justice is administered in the United
States, are derived to a great extent from those which were
in existence in England at the time of the settlement of this
country;

and it is therefore important to a correct under-

standing of the nature and character of our own jurisprudence,
no* only to trace it baok to its in-roduction here on the
early settlement of the colonies, but also to trace the English jurisprudence from its earliest conception as the administration of law, founded in -rinciples, down to that period.
It is in this way that we are enabled to explain many

-4things ill Our own p>ractice which ';vould.otherwise be entirely
.articulc-rly true of the principles which

This is

obscure.

regulate the jurisdiction and practico
Equity,
plicd

of the courts of

and of the principoles of Equity as they are now ap-

and administered in

the courts of law which at the

present day have equitable jurisdiction conferred upon them
that purposc.

by statutes pafsed fr

And for the purpose

of a conpetent undorstanding of the Equity in England, it is
necessary to r(fc, to the orig-in of the equitable jurisdiction there, and,

to ltrae its history, inquiring upon what

pr nciples it was ori "inally founded, and how it has boen
enlarged and sustaired.
The study of E;Iuity Jurisprudence, therefore, comprises
an inquiry into the origin and history of the courts of equity
the distinctive principles upon vwhich jurisdalition in Equity
is founded;

the nature,

which regulate
proceedings,
and

-actice.

its

:?nd cextent of the juris-,

p.eculiar remedies;

its

diction itself;

character,

..

ist utioa;

and nodes of defence;

its

the rules and -uaxims
rwodI

-process and

and its rules of evidence

-5-

-OL IGIN AID HISTCRYThe Courts of Equity may be said to have their origin as
far back as 1327 to 13r7,

where th o 'ing held the Great Court

in which he administered justice in person, with the assistance of his spiritual advisor.

The Chancellor.

Of the officers of this court the chancellor's was one
of great trust and confidence, next to the King himself; but
his duties do not distinctly appear at the present day.
On the introduction of seals, he had the keeping of the
King's seal, which he affiXed to charte:s and other instruments.

As writs eame into use, it was made his duty to

frame and issue

them from his court, which as early as the

reign of Henry II. was known as the Chancery.

And it is said

that he exercised at this period a sort of equitable jurisdiction by which he mitigated the rigor of the common law,to what extent is nct definitely known.
one who "annuls unjust law:is,

He is spoken of as

and executes the rightful com-

mands of the pious prince, and puts an end to what is injurious to the people or to -,orals,"
ample jurisdiction;

which would fem a very

but it seems probablc that this was

-0according to the authority or
from tule to tircj

in

iroction of tho king, g

r:uLaiun to particular cases.

'

He was

a principle member of the kings court, after the conquest, in
which,

among other thin, s,

exercise of the prerogative

all applications for the zpecial
in

regard to iatters

of judicial

cognizance were discussed and decided upon.
In

connection with the council,

he (_xercised a separate

authority in cases in which the council directed the suitors
to proceed in Chancery.

The court of Chancery is said to

have sprung from this council.
had its origin in the

But it may be said.

that it

nr+rogative of the King, by which he

undertook to administer justice, on petition to himself, without regard to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, which
he did through orders to h'is charcellor.
The great council or parliant

also se:-t matters re-

lating to the Kiity's grants, etc.,

to the chancery; and it

seems that the chancellor, although an ecclesiastic, was the
principal actor as regards the judicial business which the
select or Kings council, as well a. the great council, had
to advise upon or transact.
In

the time of ) dvarQ

III.

proccld-g

in

Chancery wore

-7party was svrmnoncd
Ivrsc

the

Co0Menccd by petition or bill,

the parties were examined, and Chancery appears as a distinct
court for
remedies,

in

c%'ao

the kin- having,

by a

-'Ivi

relief

vhich required
rit

extraordinary

referred all such matters

as were of grace to be dispatched by the Cha-cellor or by the
keeper of the privy seal.
It raay bc considered as fully cstablished as a separate
and permanent jurisdiction from the 17th. year of Richard II.
In the time of Edward IV. the chancery had come to be
regarded as one of t'm
From this time its

rCP

,

i.~ci-,Pal courts of the kingdom.

jurisdiction

ion becomes of ,1ore im'portance

:d progress

of its

jurisdict-

to us.

It is the tendancy of any legal system, when reduced to

a -practical

81lication,

to fail of affecting such justice

between party and party, as the s-ecial circumstances of acase may require, by reason of the minuteness and inflexibility of its rules and the inability of the judges to adapt its
remedies to the necessities of the co-troversy under consideration.

This was the case vith the Roman Law;

and to

remedy this defect, edicts wore issued from time to time,
which enabled the consuls and praetors to correct "1the

-0-

scrupulosity and mischievous suotloty of the 'Law,"

and from

these edicts a code of equitable jurispi- doncc was compiled.
So the principles and rules of the common law, as they were
reduced to practice became in their application the means of
injustice in cases where special equitable circumstances exisled, of which the judgo could not take cognizance because
of the precise nature of its titles and rights,

the inflex-

ible character of its pinciplos, and the technicality of
its pleadings and py'actice.

And, in a manner somewhat

analagous to the Roman mode of modification, in order to
remedy such hardships, the prerog,-tive of the king or the
authority of the great council was exercised in ancient times
to procure a more equitable neasure of justice in the particular case, which .as accomolished through the Court of Chancery.
This vias followed by the "invontion" of the writ of
subpoena, by noans of v:hich the chancery assumed, upon a
complaint made directly to that court, to require the attendance of the acverse party,

to a-1 swor to such matters as should

be objected against him.

Notwithst(anding the complaints of

the commons, from time to time, that the course of proceeding

-9in Chancery "was not according to the course of the common
law, but the p acticc of the holy church," the king sustained
the authority pf the chnuollor,.The right to issue the writ
was recognized and remulated by statute,

;zd other statutes

were passed confirming jurisdiction where it had not been
taken before.
In

this way,

without any compilation of a code,

a system

of equitable jurisprudence was established in the court of
chancery enlarging from time to time, the decisions of the
court furnishing an exposition of its principles and of their
application.
Much of equity jurisprtdence exists inldependent of any
statute, and is founded upon an assumption of a power to do
equity, having its first inception in

prerogative of the

king, and his commands to do justice in individual cases,
extending itself through the action of' the chancellor, to
the issue of a writ of summons to appear in his court without

any special auth.rity for that purpose and upon the return of
the subpoena, to the reception of a complaint, to a requirement upon the party sumnoned to make answer to that complaint,
or judgment upon the merits of the matters in controversy,

-10according to the rules of equity and good conscience.
It

apncars as a noticeable fact that the jurisdiction of

the chancery proceeded originally from, and was sustained by
successive kings of England against the repeated remonstancos
of the commons, who were aahuring to the conmon law.

The

commons were jealous of the introduction by the ecclesiastics,
of the Roman Law, and in the reign of Richard II. the barons
protested that they would never suffer the kingdom to be
governed by the Roman Law, arnd the judges prohibited it from
being ant longer cited in the common law tribunals.t'
This opposition of the barons and the comn.on law judges
furnished very sufficient reasons why the chancellor should
not profess to adopt that

law as the rule of decision.

In addition to this, it was not fitted, in many respects,
to the state of things existing in England;

and so the chan-

cellors were of necessity comp0,lled to act upon oquitable
principles as expounded by themselves.

In later times the

common law judges in that country have resorted to the Roman
Law for principles of decisions to a much greater extent than
they have given credit to it.
Since the time of Henry VIII. the Chancery Bench has

-llbeen occupied by ::,one of the ablest lawyers which England has
produced,

and they h,.V

given to the proccodiiif,-

and practice

in equity definite rules and forms, which leave litt~e to the
personal discretion of the ch-ncellor in determining what Oqu
equity and good consciencc require.
The °discretion of the chAanccllor is a judicial discretion
to be exercised according to the principle.

and the practice

of the court.
The avowed princir)le upon which the jurisdiction was at
first exercised was the administration*of justice according
to honesty, equity, and conscience-- which last was unknown
to the common law as a principle of decision.
In the 15th. year of Richard II. two petitions addressed
to the King and the lords of parliament were sent to the chancery to be heard, with the authority of parliameit, that," let
there be done that which right

.nd reason and good faith and

good conscience domated in the case."

These nay .e said

to be the general principles upon whicb equity is administered
at the present day.

-

I

EQUITY JURISDICTICN.

It would be -next to an impossibility to reduce a jurisdiction so extensive and :f such diverse component parts to a
rigid and precise classification.

But suffice it

to say

that where the courts of law do not recognizc any right, and
therefore could give no remedy, but where the courts of equity
recognize equitable rights and could of course give equitable
relief, its jurisdiction exists.

Also where the courts

of equity administer equitable relief for the infraction of
legal rights, in cases in which the Courts of law, recognizing
the right, give a remedy according to their principles, modes
and forms,

but the remeldy is

deemed by equity inadequate to

the requirements of the cEsc.
This class embraces fraud, mistake,

accident,

adminis-

tration, legacies, conttibution, and cases where justice and
conscionce requiro, the cancellation or reformation of instruments, or the rescission, or the specific performance of
contracts.

The courts of law relieve against fraud, mistake,

and accident where a remedy can be had according to their
modes and forms;

but there are many cases in

:,-,hich the legal

remedy is inadequate for the purposes of justice, and herein
of---

----

Constructive

Constructive fraud in

Fraud.----

Erjuity is

a term descriptive of

certain acts and contracts which equity regards as wrongful
and for which its courts give the

e or similar relief as

that granted in cases of actual -Fraud.
The cases of constructive fraud may be gathered under the
following heads:
First:(a),

Fraud may be apparent from the intrinsic nature

and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his
senses and not-under delusion would make, on the one hand,
and no honest or fair man would accept on the other.
Fraud may be inferred from the terms of the pontract, as
inadequacy of consideration without proof of fraud;

ordinar-

ily this is not the case, but if the inadequacy shocks the
court, tlen fraud nay be inferred,
if considered, in connection with old age,

r:c11tal weakness,

or pecuniary necessity,

equity will grant relief.
In Shaddle v. Eisborough, 310 N.J.Eq.,370, Where a person

-14his f'-m for city lots,

agrees to exch.-,

and there was no misrepresentation

to ascertain their value,

for specific performance he set gp

OCr a bill

by the owner.

but made no effort

as a defense that they wer'rc worth less than he su-posed.

Their v-lue not being so inadequate as to be evidence of
Held,

fraud,.

not -.)reJva

that the dofenso

Also in the c:asc of DaviCdon v.
a conveyance of'lied,
merely because

Little,

22 Pa."Ot.,245,

free from actual fr'InK.,

is

not void

the -i-rice ivas :hokingly inadequate.

an unexec.-uted contract will not be enforced' in

2

Though

court of

equity, if it seems to be unconscionable, yet after it is
exeuted by the parties,

it

'will not bc declared void on that

ground alone, except in the case of an heir expectant.
Gross inadequacy of' price it
But even if
quacy of -iico,

Harrison v.
trative case.
ridden,

illiterate,

of fraud.

the conveyance were -oid for gross inadeit

c

not
-n.

the land without title,
any Cne clairmin

only evidc.

be dispiuted 'y mere possessors of

neither the party who conveyed nor

under hira,
Guest,

nor his creditors disputing it.

6 De.Gex, IA.&

G.,424 is

a very illus-

An old man seventy one years of' age,

bed-

without any independent profe:sional

-15advice and without consultinz his friends or relatives, conveyed property worth 400#,r. for the consideration of being
provided with board and lodging during the rest of his life.
He lived only six weeks after making the conveyance, his
representatives sought to have the conveyance set aside.
The evidence showed that he had refused to employ professional advice for hirsclf,

that he was able to understand

the nature of the transaction, and that there were no circumstances of oppression;

the court held that there was not

sufficient ground to impeach the conveyamce.
In Scovill v. Barney, 4 Or.,

288,

The court said that

inadequacy of -rice or mental weakness standing alone, will
not warrant the interposition of equity, but when both are
combined, relief will be granted,.

It is, perhaps, not possibl

to reconcile this naked proposition with the authorities.
(b).

Contracts stipulating usury are constructively

fraudulently.
The policy of -prohibitin7usury has, generally, been
abandoned, and the Statutes concerning it repealed, in England and in

severcrl of thu Ar-orican Sttos.

In some cf the states which still adhere to the policy,

-10the usurious contract itself, the instrument by which it is
evidenced, and all its securities, are doclared to be utterly
void, in others, the stipulation for the usurious excess over
the legal interest is alone made void; while in other states
a further penalty is added to this usurious excess.
(c).

So all gaming and wager agreements are constructive-

ly fraudulent.

Although at common law certain kinds of

con+racts, based upon wagers, were not unlawful, while those
made upon a gaming consideration were illegal.
The modern legislation of England and the United States
declares all gaming and wagerfing agreements, and the instruments by which they are evidenced, or secured, to be illegal,
null and void.
(d).

Likewise all contracts in restraint of marriage are

fraudulent as being contrary to public policy.
The lavi

of England and the United States regard marriage

relation as the very foundation of society.

Since the true

conception of marriage assumes and requires a perfectly free
consent and union of the two spoicos,

Equity has, from its

earliest )eriod, treated all agreements, executory or executed
between the immediate parties, or between third persons which

-17might cUrectly or indirectly interfere in any degree with
this absolute freedom, either by promoting or restraining marriage, as opposed to public *olicy and illegal and has therefore declared them null and void.
Analogous to marriame brokerage contracts, and depending
upon the same reasons, are agreements to pay a compensation to
a person for using his influence with a testator to procure
a will, devise, or bequest to be made in favor of the promisor.
(e).

Contracts in general restraint of trade are con-

structively fraudulent as being inconsistent with the general
Unreasonableness in such contracts is

policy of te law.
the crit+erion.

But agreements in partial restraint of

trade are enforceable if reasonableand entered into for
valuable consideration.
In the cac of HRibbard v. Miller, 27 Mich.,15,
court said,

"

the

Contracts in restraint of trade, which, consid-

ered with reference to the situation, business and objects of
the parties, and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, appear to have been made for a just and honest purpose and for the protection of legitimate interests, and are
reasonable as between the -parties and not specially injurious

-18wilL be upheld,

to the y ublic,
given to the

an

the weight or effect to be

not -f-'ec'ed by any

uis

presum ption for or

the vali.ity of the restriction.
"W'i.st

Such Ccntix~cts, if unobjectionable in other respects, require
no greator pecuniary or valuable consideration to support
them than any other contr.oi;
respects,

and if

in

other

no amount of pecuniry considr,''tion wilI render

them valid.
"Where one who is en-a-ed in any branch of
chases the business

musiness,pur-

.id'.stock of another engaged in the samie

branch of business, on the condit ion that the vendor shall

not further carry on this

urtic. ar branch of business

within a reasonable extent of territory, such restraint of
trade, being reasonable and fTc.ir between the parties will be
enforced;

and the fact that the

the cost of the

1

-rice raid does not exceed

... d does
:o
not affect the validity

of the contract.
(f).

All contracts to control official conduct are ille-

gal and a7ainst public policy.
In th2 case of

v.
vieguirc
Corwin,

ii Otto, 103, the

action was b seod on a contract bett,7een A. and B. whereby in

-19-

consideration of A's procuring D"

:roi.;

o.1t as speciai

counsel in certain causes against the Unitc' Sotc-s, and-id-

ing hire. in managing the 'ofe-nco, of then, T agrees that he
will :.y A. one-1all

_ay receive from the

of the fee which he

In dcliveri-7 the opinion of the court, 1.,r.

govern.,c i:t.

Justice ;waync said"

" The law touching contracts like the

one here in qucstioh, has been often ceonsidered by this court,
It cannot be

and is well settled by our adjudications--

To do so wot.ld

necessary to go over tic same ground again.
be a wraste of tinc.

The object of this opinion is rather to

vnd-icate the aplication of our fcrrr rulings to this record
than to give them non, swuyort.

They cd o

Frauds of this ol.ss to Thinch the
longs are an unmixed evU.

e, . it.

Lot

her

disclosed be-

Vhether forbiden by statute or

condemned by -public policy, the result is the same.

legal
.:.ers

2J1.;,i'-i'
_%
-n

from such a source.

No

They are the

ad r.
irs of the -ublic welfare, and of free govern-

ment as well.
virtue and

The lticr -l,
dp,

o for its vitality upon the

oc' fL ith of those for y:>ci

those for 'Thor

it is arintstered.

forerunner of des-otisi.t

it

(,xists, and of

t

Corruption is always the

-20In Trist v. ChilCs, 21 Wallace, 441,

The court said:

while

recognizing the validity of an honest claim for services
But they are blended and confused with

honestly rendered.

those which are forbidden,"
ible.

the whole is a unit, and indivis-

That which is ba. destroys that which is good, and

they perish togethQr ------

Where

the tai'nt exists it affect

fatally, in all its -arts, the entirc body of the contract.
Where there is turpitude, the law will help neither party."
These remarks apply here.

The contract is clearly illegal,

and this action was brought to enforce it.

The case being'!

fatally and fundamentally defective, he could not recover.
(g).

"

Agreements which stipulate for private services to

be rendered by dealing with individual legislators, privately
or personally are against public policy and void.

Our law

permits a private citizen to endeavor to influence a legislature, and to obtain the enactment of a statute, in anopen,
public ma -ner, by arguments directed to the whole body or to
a committee,

in

thl

san

mar.ner as arguments are presented to

a court by counsel.
To this end, agreements for the employment of an agent

or

to act in

the same manrner are valid.

But con-

-21trvctE rl-ich Ec 1,cyond this line,

and stipultite for private

services to be rendered by dealing with individual members,
privately and personally, have been uniformly condemned by
courts of the highest authority.

The varieties of such

agreements are very numerous.
In the case of lilarzhall v. B.&

O.R.R.Co., 16 Howard, 314,

Grier.J. said, that all contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use personal, or any
secret, or sinister influence on legislators, are void.
Secrecy, as to the character under which the agent or
solicitor acts, tends tc deception,

-d is imoral and fraud-

ulent, and where the agent contracts to use such secrecy, or
voluntarily does use it, he cannot have the aid of a court of
equity to recover compensation.
(h).

Agreements having a tendancy to corrupt good morals

are contrary to public policy and, therefore void.
-It is enough in this connection to say that all agreements in which the consideration past or future, or the executory terms stipulating for scts to be done or &rmitted, are
contrary to good morals, are illegal ani void in equity, and
with a very few excc.tions, at the commnon law.

This doctrine

-)2applies in equity, whatever be the external form of the contract, or its imrmediate purpose, or the oarticulAr nature of
its illegality.

CCP'i1k"'TS , ICL

AMIOUNT TO CHALTPERTY OR MAINTENANCE

These being highly tri

hal at the common law were

guarded against with a jealous care,

but the common law rules

concerning such agreements haVe been greatly modified in the
United Syates, and to a great extent abrogated.

As,

an

agreement givin- counsel an interast in or a part of the
property to be recovered as a contingent fee for his services
in

a litigation

id

valid.

the compounding a felomy,

But,

contracts stipulating for

the forbearance to prosecute a

crime, or the abandonment of a pending crimnal prosecution
are void with all securities therein.
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CCNSTRUCTIVE FRAUD FROM THE CIRCUL'STANICES AND CONDITIONS OF
THE PARTIES;

FOR IT IS AS MUCH AGAINST CONSCIENCE TO TAKE

ADVANTAGE OF A MAN'S VEAKNESS OR NECESSITY AS OF HIS IGNORANCE

The criterion of all such contracts is the want of
a true, legal consent.
(a).

Fraud will be inferred in all contracts with idiots

lunatics, and persons of tnsound mind.
In the case of Curtis by Calkins v. Brownell, 42 Mich.,
165;

where a mortgage, made by a man who had been insane

some time before and had periodical recu.?rances of insanity,
and was insane at the time he gave the mortsage, though he
had all along managed his own affairs with average correctness and had been treated by his neighbors as competent to do
business, even while they considered him of unsound mind, was
not considered binding and was set aside as being niade while
non compos mentis, though not so manifestily insane as to
make the conduct of the mortgagee fraudulent in making the
bargain which it was meant to secure, even though he had been

-24given suf icient warning to :ut him on his -uarld.
2ut iF one is inca_7 aciotood and the contract is for

(b).
his

LenIefit,

and is *ot tainted with fraud, equity will not

interfere.
In tI( cj- e Selby v. Jackson, 0 Beavan, 102,

The court

under the circumstances refused to s 't aside deeds executed
by one under restraint in a lunatio asylum, under medical
When a. *arty, w;ithout authority, but bona fide

certificL:te.

nDoent of the proic~ty of one mientally incom-

assumes the

petent, the court will not, on his recovery, restore to him
his property without

aa~ing
an equitable allowance for the

e-penses and liabilities.
On a Lill sekking to

ct aside deeds in tote, and praying

no alternative relief, the court will not adversely grant an
accounting on the footing of their validity.
(c).

Areements entombed into in good faith and in ignor-

ance of the

ental unsounirness of the grantor.

Case of Ashcraft v. DeArmond, 44 Iowa, 220.

In this

action it was sought to set aside a conveyanc- on the ground
of the insanity of the Zrantor, snd it appeared tha: the insanity had boo

of -low and steady growth, it

was held that

evidence reswecing the riental condition of the grantor at a
period subsequent to the time of execution of the conveyance,
was competent, and that rumors in the neighborhood of the
party alleged. to be insane, respecting his mental conditioln
were not admisible in evidenco;

and also, that equity will

not interfere to set aside a 1onvcyance, on the ground of
the insanity of the grantor, to one who shall have purchased
in good faith and for value, in ignorare of the mental condition of the grantor.
Cd).

Contracts with parties mentally weak are ably dis-

cussed in the case of
Justice Field says,

Allore v. Jewiell, 4 Otto, (U.S.)

"

It is necessary in order to secure the

aid of equity, to prove that the deceased was at the time
insane, or in such a state of mental imbecility as to render
her entirely invapable of executing a valid deed.

It is

sufficient to show that, from her sickness and infirmities,
she was at the time in a condition of great mental weakness,
and that there was gross inadequacy'of consideration for the
conveyance.""

aiting Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, in which

Justice Story said

"

Extreme weakness will raisc almost a

necessary presumption of imposition, even when it stops short

-26of legal incapacity;

and though a contract in the ordinary

course of things, reasonacly made with such a person, might
be admitted to stand, yet if it should appear to be of such
a nature as that such a person could not be capable of measuring its extent or importance, its reasonableness or its
value, fully and fairly, it cannot be that the law is so much
at varia7:ce with common sense as to uphold it."
In same caso C.J.Marshall being quoted " if these deeds
were obtained by the exercise of undue influence over a man
whose mind had ceased to be the safe guide of his actions, i*
is against conscience for hi; who has obtained them to desire
-any advantage from them.

It is the peculiar province of a

court of conscionce to 7set them aside."
Where -er.ons in pecuniary distress contract, the

(e).

presumption arises that they wverc forced to sacrifice, and
eqViity may under the ciromstances,

grant relief.

--Of Distress Produced by Misrepresentation.-In

the case -Z...k..

V. Hidding,. l Txis,50&

For what

misrepresentations a conveyance of land will be cancelled.
It may be true in general, that the misrepresentations
for which equity cancels a conveyance of land, are such as

-27relate to quantity, quality, situation or value of the property, or the pecuniary responsibility of the purchaser, or
something of that nature.

But equity does not limit itself

by strict rules and strict definations in matters of fraud.
It leaves the way open to redress wrongs committed by means
of fraud, in whatever forms it may appear.
A misrepresentation producing terror and confusion of
mind, unsettling the judgment, and depriving the party of the
free use of his reasoning faculties, where such misrepresentation was purposely made in order to take advantage of the
resulting fear and mental derangement, to secure a hard and
unconscionable bargain, it was held to be a fraud in which
equity will relieve, in a proper case.

While a sale and

conveyance will not be set aside solely on the ground of inadequacy of price, yet such inadequacy, especially if gross,
is evidence of fraud.
The complaint in this case shows that when the plaintiff
conveyed his lands to defendant, he was illiterate and ignorant of business;

that he was agitated with fear by reason

of mispepresentations

s to his personal peril from the anger

of his neighbors, artfully made to him by the defendant to

-28induce him to part with his property for lefs

than its value-

that the sale and convey.Cnce wurc made hastily and in
giving plaintiff
or counsel;

secret

no opp'irtu.;ity to consult with his friends
and that the price -aid dfic. not exceed one-third

Of the value of the land.

It

was held that these averments

show good grounds for'the interposition of a court of conscienee.
Of Intoxication as a ground of relief in a court of

(f).
Equity::

The degree of intoxication which merely' exhilerates, and
does not materially affect the understanding and the will,
does not constitute a defnce to the enforcement of an executory agreement, and much less is it a ground for affirmative
relief.
An habitual drunkard is not necessarily an incompetent
person.

An intoxication which is absolute' and complete, so

that the party is for the time entirely deprived of the use
of his reason, and is wholly unable to eomprehend the nature
of the transaction and of his own acts, is a sufficient ground
for settng aside or granting other appropriate affirmative
relief against a convcyanc

or other contract made while in

-209that condition, (ven in the absence of fraud, procurement, or
undue advantage by the other party.

If a person is thus

completely intoxicated, a party openly dealing with him must
of course, perceive his condition;

it would secm that the

party knowingly taking the conveyance or contract under these
circumstances was necessarily chargeable with inequitable
conduct.
(g).

Transactions Presumptively Invalid between persons

standing in a Fiduciary Relation.
Courts of equity have carefully and wisely refrained
from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relation
in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be
excluded.
It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that
the principle extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence
reposed on one side, and the rnsulting superiority and influence on the other.
The relation and the duties involved in it need not be
legal;

it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.

Ih the foregoing illustrations there has leen an actual

undue influenc,, cono o io.ely i nad designedly exerted upon a party who was p'eculiarly susce-tible to such external pressure,
on account of his mental weakness, old age, ignorance, necessitous condition,

,n' the like...

The existence of ary fiduciary relation was unnecessary
and irmaterial.
The undue influence being established as a ft

any con-.

tract obtained or other transaction accom-plished by its means
is voidable,

-nd is set aside without the rnccssary aid of

any presumption.

The single circumstances now to be con-

sidered is the existence of some fiduciary relation, some
relation of confidence existing between two parties without
the element of mental weakness, old age, ignorance, or pecuniary distress;

if any 6f the latter elements exist they

will simply exist incidentally and not necessarily;

there

need be no intentional concealment, no misrepresentation, no
act of fraud.
The doctrine to be examined arises from the very conception and existence of a f'iducivry relation.

Equity admits

the locality of certain bona fide transactions between the
parties,

yet,

because every fiduciary relation implies a

condition of superiority held by oie of the parties over the
other, in all transactions betweon them, by which the superior
party obtains a posuible benefit.

Equity raises a presumpt-

ion against its validity, and casts upon that part

the bur-

den of -roving affirmatively the compliance with equitable
requisites and of thereby overcoming the -resumption.
One principle underlies the whole subject in all its applications; and this -rihciple is stated in both a negative
and in an affirmative form.
is mos

Its negative signification

aptly put, in a recent decision by a most able judge:

The broad principle on which the court acts in cases of
this description is, that wherever there exists such a confidence, of whatever character that confidence may be, as enables the person in whom confidence or trust is reposed to
exert influence over the person trusting him, the court will
not allow any transaction between the parties to stand,
unless there has

een the fullest and fairest explanation and

communication of every particular resting in the breast of
the one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so
trusting him."
The principle was affirmatively stated with equal

7'-)

accuracy in the Eane case on appeal, as follows;

"

The

jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity over the dealings
of persons standing in certain fiduciary relations, has always 'cel regarded as one of the most salutary description.
The principles applicable to the more fnmiliar relations of
this charcctor have been long settled by many well-known dec-isions, but the courts have always been careful not to fetter
this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its
exercise.
Vvherevcr -wo personsst

in such a relation that,

while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one,
and the influence which natuvally grows out of that confidence
is possessed by the other-, and this confidence is abused, or
the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense
of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of his
position will not be permitted to retain the advantage,
although the transaction could not have been impeached if no
1
relation had existed."
such confidential
/

Cowce v. Cornell, 71 N.Y.,91,
tive case in this relation --

is an excellent illustra-

Mr. Cornell deceased was the

grandfather of Mr.Strong who wLs looking after and managing

-'-:1-

his grandfather's business Which was quite extensive as the
old gentleme

was a very wealthy nan.

Mr. Stvong after a

while exprossed a desire to cater into business for himself
and be independent, of his grandfather.

It appcars that the

old gentleman bore the expenses of his own household and
those of his grandson also.

That , r.Strong was furnished a

dwelling house next to that of his aged ancestor.
Mr.Cornell persuaded his grandson to abndon his idea of
going into business for himself, and to continue the management of his own affairs, at the same time stating that there
Tas

money enough for them all.
I-

'o-io l

expressed a de sire to compensate his sons

kindness, by mraing some change in his will, but his lawyer
advised him to leave the will as it then stood and make the
cdmpensation in some other manner.

By virtue of this legal

advice, Mr.Cornell executed a promissory note favor of his
grandson for $20000, and this action is brought to have the
notc set aside and doeclared void on the -rounds of old age of
the maker ahd the circumstances pointing to undue influence,
together with the enormous amount named therein as compensation.

But the court held that the grandfather could place

any-estimate on the value of the -randson's services he chose
and that no arts or stratogem whatover are shown in the evidence against the young -,an, and hence the element .of constructive fraud is wanting to vitiate the validity of the note.

.7':-
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ALL FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS VWIO ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT ARE COGNIZABLE IN A COURT OF EQUITY.

This proposition may be illustrated in the case where a
composition is made by a debtor with his creditors upon the
basis of his payment to all who join in the transaction the
same proportionate share of their claims and of being therefore discharged by them from all further liability, a secret
agreement by the debtor with one of the creditors for the
latter's joining in the composition, whereby the debtor pays
or secures to the favored creditor a furthe: sum of money or
amount of property, or -reater advantage than that received
an-' shared Llike by all the others, is a Fraud u)on such
other creditors, and is voidable.
If the agreement be executory, it cannot be enforced
agrinot th; d-tor in equity or at lia;

the security may be

set aside by a court of equity, and the amount paid by the
debtor in pursuance of the contract nay be recovered back by

him.
The relief, decfensive or affirmative, thus given to the
debtor does not rest upon any considerationof favor due and
shown to him, but wholly upon motions of policy, to protect
the rights of the other creditors, and to secure them against
such frauds.
Law'rence v. Clark, 70 W.Y.,
party in

128, was a case where a

raking a composition with his creditors, secretly

entered into an agreement with one of them and made a promissory note in his favor as an inducement to him to enter into
such composition;

the note was hold as void as oeing a fraud

against the other creditors.
is given by

.

The stnme is true if the note

third person not the debtor, and any amounut can

be recovered back when so p;aid.

Solinger v. Earle,82 N.Y.393.

In Larney v. -ailey,43 !dd.,!O,
follows::
deal with *:.l1

The rule is laid down as

In a composition agreement a debtor professes to
creditors entering .it on terms of perfect

equality, and a secret agreement giving a crecditor an undue
advntae vitiates the agreement as reing a fraud upon the
otbr ocior , who may sue for and recover the full amount
of their original indebtodn.ss, less the amount they have

-'-7received under the com.position, and it is not essential that
the composition agreeer.t should first be rescinded, and the
money recovered under it be returrned.
This would seem to be the just

nd equitable effect of

such a secret bargain upon the rights cf the composition
creditors.
Argall v. Cook, 43 Conn.,160, holds that the fact of a
debtor intonding to pay certain of the creditors joining in a
composition deed, in full, out cf hi

future earnings, does

not invalidate the composition as to other creditors, if
there is no agreement tending to defraud them.

'7 r

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE TIP BULWARK CF INDIVIDUAL
PROTECTION AND TMIMEFORE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.

I have endeavored to origintate the great liberal
principles possessed by.the Court of Equity and not possessed
by any other system of jurisprudencu, and trace this liberty
through successive cases, which liberality I shall dominate
the influence of Christianity upon a vigorous and technical
set of forms and custoris.
By virtue of'

the

litei-aiity or Christian influenct

aged are rade younl- again, so far as protection is concerned;
the infant is made to have discretion and understanding;
weak-minded are given strength and even the lunatic is

the

in

some respects restored to consciousness and is treated as
having a sound and disposing mind and memCry.
The strong man also is protected rEnd made to see and
understand where he did not before realize the situation, by
reason of doccit, fraud, mistake, accident or undue influence.
Wonderful and vastly important was this change.

-39"There is no business in which men now engage which
has crone through such changes in the past century as the
Practice of law.
S'cnc of the blue laws of the ducking stool age may remain
unnoticed ?n the statute books, and the old common law-forms
may hold a precarious footin7 in the courts of a few states,
but the real currcnt of business runs in a different channel.
Evolution has a -hinin- eaz..le in our courts.
Once a Court of Equity had a very narrow jurisdiction,
and if a thing was le'c:al all of ,vicked intent could shelter
themselves under the law.
Once the practioo was so complicated by antiquated and

inconsistent forms that the wisest was often lost in its
verbiage.
But all this has

assed away under a better civilization.
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